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THE CURTAILMENT OF PRISONERS' ABILITY
TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT:
A POST-WILSON CIRCUIT SURVEY OF
PRISON CONDITIONS CASES
INTRODUCTION
Confinement restricts many of the rights and privileges
citizens normally enjoy, but it does not eliminate all constitu-
tional protection.1 The Eighth Amendment,2 for example,
prohibits more than physically barbarous punishments; it
censures the infliction of any conditions that fall below socially
accepted standards of decency.3 "In electing to impose impris-
onment as a punishment for a crime, society has incurred an
obligation to provide those in custody with the basic necessities
of a humane living environment."4  The state must provide
prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing shelter,
sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.5
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code6 allows
a person deprived of a constitutional right to seek redress in the
1 Timothy D. Zick & Jeff Trask, Prisoner's Substantive Rights, in PROJECT:
TWENTIETH ANUAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT AND COURT OF APPEALs 1989-90, 79 GEO. L.J. 1253 (1991).
2 The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
'Elizabeth F. Edwards & Nancy G. LaGow, Prison Overcrowding as Cruel
and Unusual Punishment in Light of Rhodes v. Chapman, 16 U. RICH. L. REV.
621, 622 (1982) (citing Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 813 (D. Or. 1980)).
4 Deborah A. Montick, Challenging Cruel and Unusual Conditions of
Prison Confinement: Refining the Totality of Conditions Approach, 26 How.
L.J. 227, 266 (1983).
5 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977)).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or the proper proceeding for redress.
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federal courts.7 In combination, the Eighth Amendment and
§ 1983 purport to provide relief for prisoners suffering cruel and
unusual conditions in state prison. In pursuit of other objec-
tives, however, the Supreme Court has limited the scope - and
therefore the utility - of this avenue of redress.
This article analyzes how Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence, as interpreted by Wilson v. Seiter,8 inadequately serves
prisoners attempting to enforce their right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. In Wilson, the Supreme Court effec-
tively stifled all but the most egregious prisoner complaints by
not only reaffirming the stringent totality of conditions test, but
more significantly by raising the threshold of proving deliberate
indifference. Indeed, Wilson's introduction of a culpable state of
mind component has shifted the focus of Eighth Amendment
analysis from the harm inadequate prison conditions impose on
prisoners to the culpability-of prison officials.
This article argues (1) that Wilson embraced a legal stan-
dard that unfairly increases the burden on prisoner-plaintiffs to
prove cruel and unusual treatment and (2) that the Wilson
standard promotes excessive deference to the discretion of
prison officials.9 Part I discusses the current status of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, especially with regard to deliberate
indifference analysis. Part II describes the Wilson decision.
Part III presents a survey of how the federal courts in each
circuit have addressed the Wilson standard. Part IV analyzes
Wilson's effect on Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
analysis and the consequent effects on prisoners' rights.
' To bring a § 1983 action to challenge conditions of confinement, the
prisoner must establish that a person, acting under color of state law, caused
the conditions - either through its policy or custom - resulting in the
violation of the plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights. Monell v. N.Y. City
Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
8 Ill S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
'For an opposing view, see Montick, supra note 5, at 233 (citing Comment,
Cruel But Not So Unusual Punishment: The Role of the Federal Judiciary in
State Prison Reform, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 31, 44 nn. 86 & 87 (1976) (arguing that
the totality of conditions approach is an effective means to check the foment-
ing problem of inhumane prison conditions)).
PRISON CONDITIONS CASES
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has offered no static test to determine
unconstitutional infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,
drawing the meaning of the Eighth Amendment instead from
"evolving standards of decency."'0 Legal standards thus reflect
changing public opinion regarding socially acceptable punish-
ments.1 Currently, a prisoner-plaintiff claiming an Eighth
Amendment violation under § 1983 must first show that he has
been denied a basic human need due to a deficient prison
condition or a combination of conditions. 2 The prisoner-plain-
tiff must then prove that prison officials acted or omitted to act
with "deliberate indifference.'
3
The Supreme Court introduced the totality of conditions test
in Rhodes v. Chapman.'4 Under the Rhodes test, if no single
condition establishes an Eighth Amendment violation, a prison-
er may assert an accumulation of harmful conditions. This
perspective recognizes the practical side of prison life - namely
that overcrowding, inadequate medical care, and increased
prison Qviolence are common in an era of tremendous prison
population growth. 5
In Wilson v. Seiter, e the Court reaffirmed the totality of
conditions test. The real significance of Wilson, however, is that
it embraced the deferential "deliberate indifference" standaid
first applied to prison conditions in Estelle v. Gamble.7 In
Estelle, the Court dismissed a prisoner's claim that correctional
officers provided inadequate treatment for a back injury that
the prisoner-plaintiff sustained while engaged in prison work.
The Court held that prison officials act or omit to act with
'
0 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
" Edwards & LaGow, supra note 3, at 624-25 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 119, 137 (1958)).
' See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
13 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
14 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.
" See Montick, supra note 5, at 227 (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp.
122 (D. Colo. 1979); James Lieber, The American Prison: A Tinderbox, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1981, § 6, at 26); Edwards & LaGow, supra note 3, at 621
(citing S. Reid, THE-CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM 67 (1981)).
16 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
17 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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deliberate indifference only when they cause "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain [as] proscribed by the Eighth Amend-
ment."'8 Estelle's definition of deliberate indifference narrowed
previous notions of the culpability standard by characterizing
deliberate indifference as an intentional act by prison authori-
ties: 9 the standard applies regardless of whether prison
doctors manifested indifference to prisoner's needs, or whether
prison guards intentionally denied or interfered with the prison-
er's access to medical care.2 °
Although Estelle guided Eighth Amendment analysis of
prison medical care, the Court left unclear whether the deliber-
ate indifference standard applies in other contexts.21 More-
over, it left unclear exactly what "deliberate indifference"
means. Subsequent reformulations of the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard have failed to clarify the test. For instance, in
Martin v. White,2 the Eighth Circuit held that deliberate
indifference means intent to violate, or reckless disregard for, a
prisoner's constitutional rights. Courts have equated reckless
disregard with a failure to take reasonable measures to respond
to a pervasive risk of harm to inmates.Y The contradictions
are inherent: does failure to take reasonable measures consti-
tute intent? The Wilson Court inherited this muddled definition
of deliberate indifference.
18 Id. at 104. Although the Court recognized that a prisoner could success-
fully demonstrate deliberate indifference by showing failure to care for a
serious illness or injury, it did not find the facts compelling in this case.
19 Charles F. Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEo.
L.J. 1441, 1461-62 (1989).
20 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
2' The standard of culpability was left unclear in cases involving: (1) over-
crowding; (2) violence by prison guards or other inmates; and (3) other aspects
of prison life that have the potential to create conditions of cruel and unusual
punishment.
2 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984). In Martin, a superintendent failed to
protect inmates from other violent prisoners. The court held that official
tolerance of such attacks was an Eighth Amendment violation but only if
prison officials exhibited reckless disregard for prisoner safety.
Id. To show pervasive risk of harm, a prisoner must demonstrate only
that an identifiable group of prisoners fears for its safety. Whithers v. Levine,
615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980).
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II. WILSON v. SEITER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In Wilson v. Seiter,' a prisoner-plaintiff alleged that over-
crowding, excessive noise, and inadequate heating and cooling
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner-
plaintiff "charged that the authorities, after notification, had
failed to take remedial action."2 The District Court granted
summary judgment for the prison officials because the affidavits
failed to establish the prison officials' requisite state of mind.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed.26 The conditions were not serious
enough to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, and the
prisoner-plaintiff had failed to establish that the prison officials
had acted with "persistent malicious cruelty."2
In Wilson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed both the Rhodes
totality of conditions test and the Estelle deliberate indifference
test. About the totality of conditions test the Court stated that
"Is]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth
Amendment violation 'in combination' when each would not do
so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect
that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human
need."
Extending the deliberate indifference standard beyond the
Estelle context, 9 the Court in Wilson held that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment implicitly
requires that prison officials acted or omitted to act "wanton-
ly."3  The Court found the deliberate indifference standard
articulated in Estelle to be the appropriate level of culpable
24111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
2 Id. at 2323.
26 id.
' Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 867 (6th Cir. 1990), affd, 111 S. Ct. 2321
(1991). The Supreme Court had only once before used this stringent state of
mind requirement. In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), the Court held
that a prison official who shot a prisoner in an attempt to rescue a hostage
during a prison riot did not violate the prisoner's Eight Amendment rights.
"It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause." Id. at 319.
2 111 S. Ct. at 2327.
' Id. at 2326-27. Wilson found no significant distinction between claims
alleging inadequate medical care and those alleging inadequate conditions of
confinement.
30Id. at 2323.
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intent required to prove an Eighth Amendment violation.3
Nevertheless, the meaning of "wanton" varies with the type of
conduct challenged. 2
The Wilson Court concluded that the "malicious and sadis-
tic" standard did not apply,"3 and instead implicitly adopted a
lesser standard of wanton behavior, an acknowledgment that
prison officials involved in conditions cases should have their
actions closely monitored.34 Although by choosing the lesser
standard, Wilson may mark a victory for future prisoner-plain-
tiffs,35 Wilson's affirmation of deliberate indifference presents
lower courts with the opportunity to interpret the standard
strictly, with grave implications for prisoners' civil rights claims.
Under the deliberate indifference standard, the Wilson
Court has deferred prisoner complaints to prison authorities,
refusing to permit judicial intervention in many cases where
prisoners suffer truly inhumane conditions. Wilson recognized
that prison officials face substantial practical difficulties in
responding to this nation's dilapidated and overcrowded
prisons. 6 But in attempting to strengthen the subjective com-
ponent of § 1983 cruel and unusual punishment claims, the
Court ignored the objective harm caused by the increasingly
"' See Russel W. Gray, Wilson v. Seiter: Defining the Components of and
Proposing a Direction for Eighth Amendment Prison Condition Law, 41 AM. U.
L. REV. 1339, 1360-61 (1992).
32 Id.
ss Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
'4 See Arthur B. Berger, Note, An Unsatisfying Attempt at Resolving the
Imbroglio of Eighth Amendment Prisoners' Rights Standards, 1992 UTAH L.
REV. 565, 588. When acting in highly dangerous circumstances like those in
Whitley, prison officials are likely to make more errors, and thus should
logically be subject to less scrutiny.
' Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1206 (1992). See Gray, supra note 31, at 1379 (predicting that the
Supreme Court will resolve the confusion over deliberate indifference by
adhering to the Seventh Circuit's stringent criminal recklessness require-
ment).
s The Supreme Court has accommodated practical necessities in other
areas as well, particularly criminal procedure. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984) (holding Miranda warnings are unnecessary prior to
questioning that is reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety); Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (holding police do not have an affirmative duty
to secure legal representation for defendants); U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) (creating a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures cases).
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grim conditions prisoners must face. Rather than use the
judiciary as a means to push legislatures to address these
problems, the Supreme Court has denied prisoner-plaintiffs a
remedy when they cannot show that prison officials have delib-
erately caused the inhumane conditions. Without viable § 1983
claims, prisoners' lack of political power prevents them from
effectively promoting prison reform. 7
Wilson's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment shifts the
focus of inquiry from an objective cruel and unusual punishment
standard to a subjective one. The deliberate indifference stan-
dard suggests that a prisoner-plaintiff must establish that
prison officials inflicted intentional, ad hoc punishment.8
Consequently, an actionable violation requires more than living
conditions which themselves could be considered cruel and
unusual.3 9
This shift in inquiry creates a barrier that many prisoners
subject to inhumane conditions cannot overcome. While demon-
strating mental intent itself is elusive, the vague deliberate
indifference standard exacerbates the problem.4" Russel Gray
notes that
[c]onfusion abounds when attempts are made to distin-
guish degrees of culpability between the two extremes
of negligence and intentional conduct. Nonetheless,
this is precisely the task of the courts in interpreting
the meaning of "deliberate indifference;" a task that
will largely determine the impact of Wilson. The term
"deliberate indifference" is confusing and has a number
of possible meanings. 1
Varying treatment in the lower courts4" confirms Gray's analy-
's Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 825 (1990). Moreover, the
public tends to be indifferent to the quality of prison conditions. Id. at 823.
's Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991).
9 Id. at 2326.
4 0 Martin A. Schwartz, The Decision on Prison Conditions, 206 N.Y. L.J. 3
(July 16, 1991) C[T]he Wilson Court made no attempt whatsoever to define
'deliberate indifference."').
"' Gray, supra note 31, at 1367.
42 Randy J. Amster, Defining a Uniform Culpability Standard in Section
1983, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 183, 189-190 (1990) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475
1993] 427
428 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 2:421
sis. As the following survey of the lower courts' approaches to
Wilson suggests, the deliberate indifference standard indeed
frustrates prisoners' ability to plead successful Eighth Amend-
ment claims.'
III. A CIRCUIT SURVEY OF POST-WILSON
LOWER COURT RULINGS
Analysis of post-Wilson cruel and unusual punishment cases
confirms that the deliberate indifference standard is not only
unclear but also a significant obstacle to prisoners' ability to
enforce their Eighth Amendment rights. Prisoners seeking
relief from inhumane prison conditions find no clear guide as to
how to frame their § 1983 claims. Some courts promote extreme
deference to prison officials by reading a rigorous subjective
component into the deliberate indifference standard; others
require only a showing that prison authorities were neg-
ligent."
What follows is a survey of the lower federal courts' ap-
proaches to deliberate indifference. Measuring official conduct
on a scale ranging from criminal recklessness to negligence,
Russell Gray notes that a continuum has developed in the
circuits.45 The Seventh and First Circuits require that the
prisoner-plaintiff show that the prison officials acted with
criminal recklessness. The Third, Fourth, Sixth and Tenth
Circuits require that the prisoner-plaintiff show that the prison
officials failed to act on their knowledge of harmful or risky
conditions facing prisoners. The Eleventh Circuit requires that
the prisoner-plaintiff show systematic deficiencies. The Second,
Eighth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have commented on the
Wilson standard but failed to offer their own interpretations.
U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).
See id. at 195.
Gray, supra note 31. Gray contributes to the post-Wilson debate by
highlighting the indeterminacy of the subjective prong of the deliberate
indifference standard.
46 Id.
PRISON CONDITIONS CASES
A. CRIMINAL RECKLESSNESS
1. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit's deliberate indifference standard has
generally been described as criminal recklessness. It focuses
not on whether conditions of confinement are objectively harm-
ful but rather whether they amount to punishment that is not
formally part of the prisoner's sentence. In Jackson v.
Duckworth,' the Seventh Circuit adopted the following inter-
pretation of Wilson:
The minimum intent required is "actual knowledge of
impending harm easily preventable."'47 A failure of
prison officials to act in such conditions suggests that
the officials actually want the prisoner to suffer the
harm.'
In Steading v. Thompson,49 the Circuit's first post-Wilson
cruel and unusual punishment decision, the court affirmed the
dismissal of an asthmatic inmate's claim alleging that exposure
to environmental tobacco smoke violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. The court found no violation. Judge Easterbrook wrote
in Steading that if the prison officials "do not intend [the prison-
er-plaintiffs] discomfiture they have not punished him, and so
do not violate the cruel and unusual punishments clause ;as
Wilson interprets that amendment."5
Following Steading, the Seventh Circuit reasserted that the
focus of Eighth Amendment inquiry should be unauthorized
punishment of prisoners - not conditions of confinement. In
46 955 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1992).
47 Id. at 22 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 78 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir.
1985)).
48 Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991)) (emphasis
added).
49 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1206 (1992).
ro Id. at 500. Since the "Eighth Amendment is concerned with 'punish-
ment,"' id., showing that prison authorities had a culpable state of mind is
essential to finding a constitutional violation. See also McGill v. Duckworth,
944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991); Thomas v. Cabanaw, No. 91-2173, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27488 (7th Cir. October 23, 1992); James v. Milwaukee County,
955 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1992).
1993] 429
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Duane v. Lane,5 for example, the Seventh Circuit stated that
prison officials must want to harm the prisoner or demonstrate
"total unconcern" for a prisoner's welfare.52 The court in
Duane held that the prison officials were not liable because they
were not "entirely indifferent" to the prisoners' safety.5"
Under the Seventh Circuit's approach, Eighth Amendment
violations turn on the culpability of prison administrators and
the limitations facing them, not the actual conditions of prison
life. Like Wilson, Steading fails to recognize that prisoners
suffer the same hardships from inhumane conditions, regardless
of whether the conditions result from formal sentencing, admin-
istrative neglect, overcrowding, or resource limitations.
2. First Circuit
The First Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit in Steading
in adopting a criminal recklessness standard. In DesRosiers v.
Moran,54 a prisoner filed suit alleging that the prison officials
had failed to furnish him with adequate medical care during his
incarceration. The district court found that the prison officials
had made a good faith effort to provide the plaintiff DesRosiers
with the best care possible, and entered a judgment for the
defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.
Citing Wilson and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Steading,
the court held that the prisoner must prove both that the prison
officials had a culpable state of mind and intended to wantonly
inflict pain.5" The court further described the standard as
recklessness, "not in the tort-law sense, but in the appreciably
stricter criminal-law sense, requiring actual knowledge of
impending harm, easily preventable.
56
Indeed, DesRosiers extended Wilson's requirement that
prison officials act with deliberate indifference. Under the
51 959 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1992).
52 Id. at 676. An Eighth Amendment violation occurs only when prison
officials fail to prevent an injury that they know will cause a harm. Id.
5 3 Id. at 677.
949 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1991).
51 Id. at 19 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25 (1991) and
Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1206 (1992)).
5 Id. (citing Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324-26; McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d
344, 347 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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DesRosiers criminal recklessness standard, for example, prison
administrators are essentially free to ignore the obligation
imposed on them by Estelle v. Gamble.57 The holding in Des-
Rosiers suggests that prisoners' medical needs will go unmet
because they must rely on the good will of prison authorities to
provide medical attention.58 By requiring a prisoner to show
that prison officials deliberately or intentionally failed to pro-
vide medical care, the First Circuit makes asserting Eighth
Amendment violations for lack of adequate medical care vir-
tually impossible. While the Wilson Court acknowledged the
practical limitations facing prison officials, DesRosiers goes quite
far in deferring to prison administrators; at some point, limited
resources, overcrowding, and inadequate facilities necessarily
limit prisoners' medical care.
B. KNOWLEDGE AND FAILURE TO ACT
The Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits require a
prisoner asserting an Eighth Amendment claim to show that
prison officials failed to act on dangerous or inhumane condi-
tions about which they knew or should have known. In con-
trast, the criminal recklessness standard requires that a prison-
er show that prison officials desired a harmful condition. The
"knowledge plus failure to act" interpretation of deliberate
indifference is thus less stringent than criminal recklessness,
but it nevertheless presents significant obstacles to a prisoner's
ability to protect their Eighth Amendment rights.
1. Third Circuit
In the Third Circuit, a prisoner-plaintiff meets the burden
of establishing deliberate indifference by showing that prison
administrators, faced with inadequate prison conditions, chose
not to pursue curative measures. This standard thus frees
prisoners from proving intent,59 but nevertheless focuses on
the culpability of prison officials.
57 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that prison officials must provide minimally
adequate medical care).
8 See id. at 103.
59 See Gray, supra note 31, at 1368.
1993]
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The Third Circuit addressed Wilson for the first time in
Simmons v. City of Philadelphia.° In Simmons, an emotional-
ly disturbed inmate hanged himself after being arrested for
intoxication. His estate alleged that the prison officials' failure
to provide adequate medical care constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor
of the estate. The Simmons court stated that a prisoner estab-
lishes deliberate indifference if he shows that the prison officials
"were aware of the number of suicides in City lock-ups and of
the alternatives for preventing them, but either deliberately
chose not to pursue these alternatives or acquiesced in a long
standing policy or custom of inaction."61  Only a showing of
some affirmative action by prison officials, like preventative
measures or enhanced officer training, could defeat a prisoner's
claim.
62
In Young v. Quinlan,3 the Third Circuit attempted to
clarify the standard articulated in Simmons. In Young, a
federal prisoner alleged that prison officials had inflicted cruel
and unusual punishment upon him by failing to protect him
from attacks by other inmates and by confining him to unsani-
tary living conditions." Acknowledging the split in the circuits
regarding the quantum of knowledge needed to satisfy the
Wilson standard, Young found deliberate indifference to occur
when prison officials knew or should have known of a serious
danger to an inmate and failed to act.65
2. Fourth Circuit
To prove an Eighth Amendment violation in the Fourth
Circuit, a prisoner must establish both that prison conditions
were objectively cruel and unusual and that the defendants
60 947 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1991).
61 Id. at 1064.
62 Id. at 1071. The Simmons court articulated its understanding of
deliberate indifference not in the context of defining the scope of the test, but
rather in determining whether the record was "critically deficient of the
minimum quantum of evidence" from which the jury reasonably could have
concluded that the failure of City Policy makers to take any of those preventa-
tive measures amounted to deliberate indifference.
6 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1992).
6 Id. at 353-56.
65 Id. at 360-61.
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acted with a culpable state of mind. In Williams v. Griffin,66
for example, an inmate alleged that overcrowded and unsani-
tary conditions in his prison constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 7 Even though the district court did not require
the plaintiff to prove deliberate indifference, it granted the
prison officials' motion for summary judgment. The Fourth
Circuit reversed.68 Citing Rhodes and Wilson, the Williams
court defined the deliberate indifference standard to require a
showing that "prison officials had knowledge of the conditions
that are the subject of the complaint."69
3. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has endorsed the knowledge and failure
to act standard. In Doe v. Sullivan County, the plaintiff
alleged that systematic deficiencies at the prison violated the
Eighth Amendment. The district court's jury instructions
defined deliberate indifference to require that the particular
official was "aware that a particular act or inaction was certain
to or substantially certain to deprive plaintiff of his constitution-
al rights and that the defendant decided to act or not act in spite
of that knowledge."71 Finding in favor of the prison officials,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the "instructions accurately
stated each element that a plaintiff was required to establish
under the Eighth Amendment, including the requirement that
the evidence support a finding of 'deliberate indifference."'7
In Gibson v. Foltz," an inmate's widow filed a § 1983
claim following the stabbing death of her husband. Affirming
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defen-
dants, the Sixth Circuit stated that a lack of due care for a
prisoner's safety is insufficient to support an Eighth Amend-
ment violation. 4 The Gibson court found that "obduracy and
r 952 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1991).
67 Id. at 821, 822. Twelve inmates were cramped into a twenty foot square
cell, with six beds and a urine-soaked toilet.
68 Id. at 826-27.
69 Id. at 826.
70 956 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1992).
1 Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 555-56.
73 963 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1992).
' Id. at 853 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991) and
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wantonness, not inadvertence or good faith error, characterize
deliberate indifference."7 Thus Gibson confirms that cruel and
unusual conditions do not obviate Wilson's subjective intent
requirement.
4. Tenth Circuit
Although the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
never itself detailed the contours of deliberate indifference, it
has followed Wilson. In Miller v. Glanz,7" the Tenth Circuit
reviewed a district court's dismissal of a claim alleging deliber-
ate indifference to medical needs following a beating the prison-
er had allegedly received at the hands of four correctional
officers. After noting that Wilson clarified Estelle's deliberate
indifference standard to have both an objective and a subjective
component, the court concluded:
Although the injuries and accompanying deprivation of
medical care that [the plaintiff] alleges in his amended
complaint may be sufficiently serious to meet the objec-
tive component of the deliberate indifference standard,
the amended complaint fails to allege that any of the
defendants acted with the state of mind required to
meet the subjective or intent component of the stan-
dard.7"
Since the district court dismissed the prisoner's complaint for
failing to allege the defendants' subjective state of mind, Miller
did not address the requirements of the deliberate indifference
standard. Nevertheless, it follows Wilson in holding that the
plaintiff must show defendants' culpability.
In Baker v. Holden,78 the district court for the Northern
District of Utah suggested that the Tenth Circuit will adopt the
"knowledge and failure to act" interpretation of deliberate
indifference. Adopting Wilson's pragmatic approach to constitu-
tional analysis, the court in Baker held that no Eighth Amend-
ment violation occurs without a showing of official knowledge of
McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876, 880-81 (6th Cir. 1988)).
75 Id.
76 948 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1991).
77 Id. at 1569.
78 787 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Utah 1992) (double ceiling).
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a prisoner's need and an unwillingness to act.79  The court
stated that judges should defer to correctional authorities,
giving consideration to the limitations they face:"0 "It]his court
may not impose its own enlightened views of correctional policy
on state correctional authorities.""1
D. A SOFTER INTERPRETATION OF WILSON? THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT'S SYSTEMATIC DEFICIENCIES APPROACH
In Harris v. Thigpen, 2 the Eleventh Circuit stated that
"systematic deficiencies" can provide a sufficient basis to find
deliberate indifference. On its face this approach is more
favorable to prisoner-plaintiffs than both criminal recklessness
and the "failure to act on knowledge" standard. Through the
development of the Circuit's approach, it appears Wilson's
subjective component still presents significant obstacles to
prisoners seeking to enforce their Eighth Amendment rights.
In Payne v. Monroe County,8" an inmate alleged that pris-
on officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to
prevent another inmate from slashing him with a razor blade.
The plaintiff charged (1) that the prison officials knew or should
have known that the attacker had a history of committing
assaults in prison, and (2) that the officials failed to isolate the
attacker from the general prison population.' The plaintiff
asserted also that his attacker possessed a razor blade because
prison officials failed to enforce prison policy.85
The magistrate's report in Payne found that the plaintiff
properly alleged that overcrowding at the jail was a "prison
custom," and that the Eighth Amendment violation was caused
79 1d. at 1018.
8 0 Id. at 1015-1016.
81 d. at 1016. A demonstration of limited administrative resources would
prevent official liability in the face of even the worst conditions of confine-
ment. But the court went on to state that "[however, the deference accorded
prison officials is not absolute. In this regard, inmates may not be confined in
unsafe conditions." Id. (citations omitted).
82 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
8 779 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (ratifying, approving, and affirming
the magistrate's report and recommendation in its entirety).
8 Id. at 1332.
8 Id.
1993] 435
436 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 2:421
by the overcrowding.86 However, the magistrate granted the
prison officials' motion to dismiss. Payne held that although the
prison authorities' acts may have amounted to negligence, the
plaintiff failed to allege facts which would meet Wilson's subjec-
tive intent requirement."7 To meet the deliberate indifference
standard, the prisoner-plaintiff would have had to show that the
prison officials knew or should have known that the attacker
was likely to attack.8"
The Payne court properly applied Wilson's subjective intent
requirement. That the court dismissed the plaintiffs claim
illustrates the harsh result compelled by the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard. Even where the negligence of prison officials
leads to egregious harm, Wilson puts Eighth Amendment
remedies beyond prisoners' reach.
One month after the Payne decision, the Eleventh Circuit
adopted the "systematic deficiencies" interpretation of deliberate
indifference. In Harris v. Thigpen,8 9 the plaintiffs challenged
the defendant-prison's policy of testing all incoming inmates for
sexually transmitted diseases, and of separating those who test
positive for HIV from the general prison population. Finding no
Eighth Amendment violation, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
systematic deficiencies can provide a sufficient basis for a
finding of deliberate indifference.9 ° Significantly for future
prisoner-plaintiffs, the court said that "a series of incidents
closely related in time may disclose a pattern of conduct amoun-
ting to deliberate indifference. '"91
Despite its "liberal" approach to the deliberate indifference
standard, the Harris court was unable to find sufficient evidence
in the record to support such a finding. Still, this decision
turned on the facts, and not the subjective component of Wilson.
This interpretation of the deliberate indifference standard
6 Id. at 1334.
87 id.
8 8 Id.
'9 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
0 Id. at 1505 (citing Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir.
1986)).
"' Id. Specifically, systematic and gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities,
equipment, or procedures may constitute deliberate indifference. Id. (citing
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980)).
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suggests that the prisoner litigant in the Eleventh Circuit may
have a less demanding burden to meet.
E. OPEN QUESTIONS
The Second and Eighth Circuits have established no clear
position on the subjective inquiry continuum, thus perpetuating
the uncertainty prisoners face in bringing Eighth. Amendment
claims. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits are uncertain about their
interpretation of deliberate indifference.
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has never interpreted the deliberate
indifference standard. In Nolley v. County of Erie,92 however,
the Western District of New York appeared to require prisoners
asserting Eighth Amendment claims to prove official culpability
beyond simple negligence. In Nolley, a former holding center
inmate who had tested positive for the human immune-deficien-
cy virus (HIV), claimed that she did not get proper medical
treatment because she received her AZT93 treatments late or
not at all. The court held that the prisoner had alleged suffi-
cient facts to satisfy Wilson's objective requirement by showing
"deplorable conduct in the care of an HIV+ inmate,"94 but had
failed to meet the subjective component of the test.95 The
court in Nolley did not address specifically what the plaintiff
must show to satisfy the subjective mental state requirement of
the deliberate indifference test. It did state, however, that the
"Supreme Court held [in Wilson] that for conditions of confine-
776 F. Supp. 715 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
93 According to a doctor's testimony, AZT must be taken every four hours
to avoid serious harm to an HIV+ person. Id. at 719.
94Id. at 740.
9 Id. The court reached the following conclusion:
[S]everal instances where plaintiffs AZT was either not delivered or
was delivered late, did ... deprive plaintiff of a necessity of life
under the Eighth Amendment. AZT is an absolutely vital medica-
tion for HIV+ persons because it is the only medication known to
slow the advance of the disease. With the objective component of
the Eighth Amendment violation thus proven, the question is
whether defendants late delivery or non-delivery of AZT amounted
to "deliberate indifference." The court finds that it did not.
19931 437
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ment to violate the Eighth Amendment, prison officials creating
those conditions must have possessed a culpable state of
mind. ,9
6
2. Eighth Circuit
While its opinion in Murphy v. Dow9" suggests approval of
the Seventh Circuit's criminal recklessness standard, the Eighth
Circuit ultimately avoided framing its own definition of deliber-
ate indifference. In Murphy, the plaintiff alleged that involun-
tary exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) violates
the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary
judgment for the prison officials based on their qualified immu-
nity. Although the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court on this ruling,9" the Murphy court in
dicta followed the Seventh Circuit's standard.99 The court
stated "that mere exposure to ETS alone cannot constitute cruel
and unusual punishment because smoke is not 'punish-
merit.,,,100
Noting the high burden Wilson's subjective component
places on prisoners, the Eighth Circuit noted that under
Steading "it is next to impossible for a prisoner to prove such a
claim because prison officials who allow inmates to smoke 'could
not plausibly be accused of reaching this decision because they
hope the smoke will injure other prisoners.""O' Thus, while
the Eighth Circuit avoids precluding prisoners with a strict
interpretation of deliberate indifference, it perpetuates the
uncertainty they face in presenting their claims.
3. Fifth Circuit: Another Resource Limitations Argument
The Fifth Circuit has not established an interpretation of
the deliberate indifference standard, but its holding in Alberti v.
Sheriff of Harris County,"2 suggests at least some inquiry into
' Id. at 740 (citing Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2323-26).
9 975 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1992).
9 Id. at 437.
Id. (citing Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1206 (1992)).
100 Id.
101 Id. (citing Steading, 941 F.2d at 500).
102 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Richards v. Lindsay,
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the prison officials' culpability. Perhaps more significantly, the
decision in Alberti echoes Wilson's invidious "pragmatism." It
requires a review of the constraints facing prison officials in
alleviating poor prison conditions. °3
In Alberti, a prisoner brought a § 1983 class action alleging
that the conditions in the overcrowded county jails violated the
Eighth Amendment. In the district court, the parties and the
court focused on the objective conditions of confinement in the
county's jails. They did not consider the state's intent an
element of the cause of action. While the appeal in Alberti was
pending, the Supreme Court decided Wilson v. Seiter.0 4  In
light of the Wilson opinion, the Fifth Circuit in Alberti remand-
ed the case to determine whether the state was deliberately
indifferent to conditions at the jails in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
Alberti illustrates Wilson's crippling effect on Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. The district court held that the
objectively cruel and unusual prison conditions in the county
jails violated the constitution. Yet because Wilson's subjective
component requires official culpability, the Fifth Circuit re-
manded the district court's decision. Moreover, Alberti's conclu-
sion that a finding of deliberate indifference includes a review of
the constraints on prison officials further limits prisoners'
claims. Assuming a prisoner satisfies the objective and subjec-
tive components of Wilson, the affirmative defense of financial
incapacity may frustrate an Eighth Amendment claim.'05
4. Ninth Circuit: Actual Knowledge and Failure to Act-
One Successful and One Unsuccessful Claim
The confusion and inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit illus-
trates the difficulty prisoner-plaintiffs have in determining the
culpability requirements for their Eighth Amendment claims.
The Ninth Circuit seems to interpret deliberate indifference as
112 S. Ct. 1994 (1992).
103 Amanda Rubin, Note, Before and After Wilson v. Seiter: Cases Chal-
lenging the Conditions of Confinement in the Ninth Circuit, 22 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 207, 229 (1992).
104 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
105 Fortunately, lack of legislative funding is only a consideration in the
inquiry and is not dispositive. Rubin, supra note 103, at 229 (citing Alberti,
937 F.2d at 999-1000).
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requiring actual knowledge and a failure to act, but offers
conflicting- applications of the Wilson standard. In Redman v.
County of San Diego,"0 6 a pretrial detainee claimed that in
light of prisoners' threats of violence and his pleas for protec-
tion, he was improperly placed in a dangerous situation. Re-
versing the district court's directed verdict for the defendant
officials, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had
demonstrated deliberate indifference by the county and prison
officials who were responsible for the prison procedural policies
that resulted in overcrowded jails and safety problems.'0 ° The
Redman court held that "the term 'policy' 'generally implies a
course of action consciously chosen from among various alterna-
tives."" 8 Although not directed at the prisoner and not in-
tended as punishment, this consciously chosen course of action
satisfied the deliberate indifference standard.
Whitmore v. Sumner,' however, suggests that in the
future the Ninth Circuit will interpret Wilson's subjective
component more strictly. In Whitmore, the plaintiff claimed
that in-prison exposure to the human immune-deficiency virus
violates the Eighth Amendment. In a memorandum opinion,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judg-
ment for the defendant prison officials. The plaintiff failed to
present sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference. °" 0 The
dissent in Whitmore points out that the facts belie the conclu-
sion that there was not sufficient evidence to prove the prison
officials were deliberately indifferent:
Here, plaintiffs presented evidence that prison officials
placed plaintiffs in contact with an HIV-infected inmate
who had not only thrown his urine at other inmates,
but had also engaged in self-mutilation in an effort to
infect other persons through contact with his blood.
Plaintiffs also presented evidence that suggested that
prison officials had taken precautions to protect staff of
'06 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991).
1o0 Id. at 1443-46.
108 Id. at 1445 (quoting City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823
(1985)).
'09 944 F.2d 910 (table cite) (No. 89-15861), 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22210
(9th Cir. September 17, 1991).
110 Id. at *1 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991)).
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the correctional facility, but did not show similar con-
cern for the safety of prisoners."'
Thus even in a situation where prison officials allowed a violent,
HIV-infected inmate to remain in contact with the general
prison population, the Ninth Circuit refused to find an Eighth
Amendment violation.
In McKinney v. Anderson," the Ninth Circuit held that
housing a prisoner in an environment that exposes him to
environmental tobacco smoke is cruel and unusual punishment
because it poses an unreasonable risk of harm to his health."
3
On the plaintiffs appeal from the court's refusal to allow dam-
ages, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, and remanded
for further consideration in light of its decision in Wilson." 4
On remand, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Supreme
Court had expanded the requirements of an Eighth Amendment
claim by adding a subjective component." 5 Even though the
conditions of his confinement amounted to cruel and unusual
conditions, ultimately the prisoner's claim failed. The defendant
prison officials did not act with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind.
IV. ANALYSIS
The prediction that "[tihe Court's decision in Wilson will
tighten the thumb screws on Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence""' 6 proved prophetic. Wilson and its progeny
have limited prisoners' ability to enforce the Eighth Amendment
through § 1983 actions by deferring to the judgment of prison
officials. Indeed, the Wilson Court's emphasis on recognizing
the limitations on prison officials essentially requires courts to
ignore the dangerous and inhumane conditions prisoners face.
Given that prisoners' lack of political power prevents them from
1 1 Id. at *3 (dissenting opinion).
112 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated sub nom. Helling v. McKinney,
112 S. Ct. 291 (1991).
13 Id. at 1503-04.
14 112 S. Ct. 291 (1991).
15 McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1991).
116 Daniel T. Dalton, Tightening the Thumb Screws on Civil Liberties:
Wilson v. Seiter: It's Impact on Prisoner Claims and Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 60 U. Mo-KAN. CITY L. REV. 542, 543 (1992).
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promoting prison reform elsewhere," 7 the Wilson standard is
particularly invidious.
By routinely deferring to the expertise of prison administra-
tors in setting institutional policy, Wilson and the cases follow-
ing it subordinate inmates' needs to the demands of maintaining
order and discipline."8 Commentators point out that
[t]he courts stress the complexity of prison problems.
The constant risk of violence requires an assessment of
danger that involves more than the individual case and
specific facts. Prison officials must make intuitive
judgments based on imponderable factors, necessarily
subjective and predictive. Their expertise is almost
mystical. It not only justifies deference by legitimating
the delegation of discretion, but finally it requires that
courts remove themselves from the process. Prison is
so complicated and so dangerous that judicial interven-
tion can only do harm."9
Wilson's deliberate indifference standard embraces this
view. 12  By according generous deference to prison officials,
the Wilson Court has placed a roadblock in the path of
prisoners' efforts to obtain humane prison conditions through
Eighth Amendment claims. 12 1 Indeed, overcrowding, deterio-
rating facilities, and limited funding make providing humane
prison conditions difficult; the deliberate indifference standard's
.17 Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 825 (1990). Moreover, the
public tends to be indifferent to the quality of prison conditions. See id. at
823.
118 Id.; Berger, supra note 34, at 596.
119 Lance D. Cassak, Hearing the Cries of Prisoners: The Third Circuit's
Treatment of Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 526, 598
(1989) (quoting Johnathan Willens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of
War: American Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years, 1962-87, 37 AM. U. L.
REV. 41, 122-23 (1987)).
' Wilson demonstrates the Court's reluctance to substitute its judgment
regarding difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration and
security for that of those actually experienced and trained to run the facility.
Prisoners' Rights, in PROJECT: NINETEENTH ANNUAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND COURTS OF APPEAL 1988-
89, 78 GEO. L.J. 1429, 1459 and n.3561 (1990).
121 Berger, supra note 34, at 566.
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focus on the culpability of prison officials makes using the
courts to address these difficulties impossible for prisoners.
Specifically, Wilson and its progeny limit prisoners' ability
to vindicate their right to be free from cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in two ways. First, the vagueness of Wilson's deliber-
ate indifference standard frustrates successful Eighth An~end-
ment claims not only by making determinations of local culpa-
bility requirements difficult for prisoners, but also by presenting
the lower courts with opportunities to interpret the deliberate
indifference test strictly. Second, a rigorous subjective standard
makes it difficult for individual prisoners to allege sufficient
instances of misconduct to satisfy the deliberate indifference
standard.2 In the Seventh Circuit, for example, prisoners
unable to prove that prison officials intended the inhumane
conditions state no Eighth Amendment claim.
A. WILSON'S DEFERENTIAL APPROACH MISGUIDES
EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Wilson's excessive deference results in standards which can
be manipulated to prevent prisoners from obtaining redress for
conditions which are patently Eighth Amendment violations.
By narrowing the definition of wantonness and enlarging the
applicability of the qualified immunity doctrine, the Wilson
decision has limited the ability of prisoners to demand liveable
prison conditions.
Demonstrating its commitment to deference to prison
authorities, the Court in Wilson delineated an affirmative
defense to the subjective state of mind requirement." Con-
duct is "wanton," or per se deliberately indifferent, only if it is
extreme, relative to the constraints facing the official.' Rus-
sell Gray argues that by predicating wantonness on the difficul-
ties facing prison officials, the Court left open the possibility
that problems like overcrowding and lack of funding could
vitiate otherwise valid Eighth Amendment claims.'25 Such an
' James P. Rosenzweig, State Prison Conditions and the Eighth Amend-
ment: What Standard for Reform under Section 1983?, 1987 U. CH. LEGAL F.
411, 412-13.
" Gray, supra note 31, at 1361-62 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321,
2326 (1991)).
Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
'2 Gray, supra note 31, at 1362.
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approach makes Eighth Amendment concerns subordinate to
the financial considerations of prison management.' 8
The Wilson decision's emphasis on deference to prison
officials also effectively limits culpability by reformulating the
doctrine of qualified immunity.'27 Judicial deference allows
prison officials to set the standard by which the reasonableness
of their actions will be judged. In doing so, they are able to
create qualified immunity for decisions which impose even the
most egregious conditions on prisoners. "Under the current
standard, qualified immunity protects officials acting within the
scope of their discretionary duties unless their conduct violates
clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."'28  After Wilson, prison officials
attempting to maintain prison security or control may unjustly
constrain prisoners' constitutional rights.
B. A VAGUE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD
CREATES UNCERTAINTY AND OPPORTUNITIES TO
FURTHER RESTRICT EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Because the term "deliberate indifference" is so flexible, 129
the ability of lower courts to interpret it simultaneously pres-
ents opportunities to obviate Wilson's worst consequences and
threatens further attacks on prisoners' rights. One possible
interpretation, for example, favors prisoners' claims by basing
culpability on inexcusable lack of knowledge. A "prison official's
lack of knowledge of harmful conditions may be so offensive that
Berger, supra note 34, at 595.
'7 The defense of qualified immunity limits prison officials' liability by
denying prisoners a damage remedy for conduct that violates the Constitution.
See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 23, 26 (1989) (positing that the Supreme Court requires that the uncon-
stitutionality of an official's action be clearly established to be outside the
qualified immunity doctrine); see also Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Qualified
Immunity for Government officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose
in Civil Rights Legislation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 132 (1985) (arguing that in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court set out to
increase the protection afforded governmental officials).
o John D. Kirby, Qualified Immunity for Civil Rights Violations: Refining
the Standard, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 462, 469 (1990) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at
817-18).
m Gray, supra note 31, at 1343.
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it also rises to the level of deliberate indifference."'' 0 Russell
Gray argues that "courts should attempt to avoid defining
'deliberate indifference' as a high degree of tortious or criminal
recklessness in the context of prisoners' Eighth Amendment
challenges to confinement conditions."'' Applying such a
standard poses the problematic task of examining the intent of
prison officials.
Ultimately, however, Wilson's failure to define deliberate
indifference gives lower federal courts an opportunity to con-
strue the standard to the detriment of a prisoner plaintiff. For
example, federal courts within the First and Seventh Circuits
have concluded that conduct is deliberately indifferent only
when it reaches the level of criminal recklessness." 2 Prison
officials must know of the high degree of risk in their actions or
inactions, rather than merely acting or failing to act in a highly
risky manner. Gray criticizes the Seventh Circuit for adopting
the most extreme subjective standard,'33 and predicts that the
Supreme Court will resolve the confusion over deliberate indif-
ference by adhering to this stringent criminal recklessness
requirement.3 4 Gray's conclusions seem justified given the
prominent role the subjective component of the deliberate
indifference inquiry plays in nearly every circuit - a reflection
of the general deference to correctional facility administrators.
As the survey in Part III suggests, the experience of prison-
er-plaintiffs in the lower federal courts leaves a muddled picture
of the Wilson standard. Even if the Supreme Court does not
frustrate Eighth Amendment claims by requiring criminal
recklessness, the confusion over deliberate indifference itself
obstructs prisoners' claims. A prisoner who cannot ascertain
13Od. at 1371.
131 1d.
132 See, e.g., Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1206 (1992); Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21 (7th Cir.
1992); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1991). Amanda Rubin
argues that only the Steading decision has promulgated a strict interpretation
of the deliberate indifference standard. Rubin, supra note 103, at 230. This
is a questionable reading of the case law. Although it avoided the term
"actual intent," the Seventh Circuit in Jackson equated a failure to act in the
face of a known harm with conduct that suggests that an official wanted a
prisoner to suffer the harm. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
' Gray, supra note 31, at 1379.
134 Gray argues the Court will move towards criminal recklessness to
promote deference to prison administrators. Id.
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what a specific court requires for a successful Eighth Amend-
ment claim will not be able to handle his claim effectively. The
confusion over the subjective standard thus exacerbates the
problems of proving intent in the first place.
CONCLUSION
To reduce the burden on prisoners to raise a sufficient
Eighth Amendment claim, courts must first clarify the deliber-
ate indifference standard. This would eliminate a great deal of
the ambiguity and uncertainty which has plagued the lower
courts and frustrated prisoner plaintiffs. This solution, howev-
er, does not address the heavy burden of the subjective state of
mind component of deliberate indifference. Eliminating or
softening this requirement is essential to revitalizing the effica-
cy of Eighth Amendment causes of action.
The simplest approach to reforming the subjective standard
inquiry is to eliminate it. Although a state of mind requirement
may be appropriate in instances where a single official act of
misconduct is alleged to be unconstitutional, this inquiry should
be unnecessary'35 in cases of "continuing" or "systemic" condi-
tions. 3 ' The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has taken such a
systematic deficiencies approach.
37
A return to the objective standard described in Rhodes v.
Chapman3 has a strong policy basis. Without a state of
mind requirement, courts could focus on whether prisoners are
in fact denied the most basic human needs. Focusing on the
suffering of the victim and the severity of the harm, instead of
on the intent or motivation of the inflictor, is a key step to
forcing the courts to protect the convicted from excessive suffer-
ing.3 9 Moreover, financial constraints and other practical
difficulties would be irrelevant under an objective standard.
135 Dalton, supra note 116, at 550.
136 Amy Newman, Note, Supreme Court Review: Eighth Amend-
ment - Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Condition Cases, 82 J. CRIM. L.
979, 983 (1992).
37 See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
138 452 U.S. 337 (1981). "The Rhodes decision properly focused on the
objective conditions as experienced by the inmates and whether those condi-
tions result in the 'unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human
needs,' or 'deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life's
necessities."' Rubin, supra note 103, at 234 (citing Rhodes).
139 Gray, supra note 31, at 1359.
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A solely objective reading of the Eighth Amendment's cruel
and unusual punishment clause can be reconciled with the
constitutional language. The reading proposed in the Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Wilson argued that
"although 'purpose to inflict unnecessary pain' suggests an
intent requirement, the second part of the quotation, 'nor any
unnecessary pain,' suggests that unnecessary pain without
regard to the state of mind of the inflictor would be sufficient to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. '140  The plaintiff
would have to show that neither inhumane conditions were
formally sanctioned as punishment nor a prison official was
deliberately indifferent in the face of the harms which these
conditions pose. That the conditions exist, and that they inflict
some consequence which would fail to meet minimal standards
of human decency (i.e. unnecessary pain) would be sufficient.
Several Supreme Court Justices have called for the aban-
donment of the state of mind requirement. In Wilson, Justice
White, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Marshall,
argued in a concurring opinion that the intent of prison officials
should be irrelevant in evaluating the constitutionality of
conditions of confinement. Justice White argued that the
Wilson majority's subjective standard "disregards our prior
decisions that have involved challenge to conditions of confine-
ment, where we have made it clear that the conditions are
themselves part of the punishment, even though not specifically
'meted' out by statute or judge.""141
The Wilson standard frustrates prisoners' only means of
protecting their right to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment. As wards of the state, prisoners are at the mercy of
prison officials and should not forfeit what few constitutional
privileges they have because the officials were not sufficiently
culpable. While official culpability may at times exacerbate the
cruelty of inhumane conditions, deference to prison officials
should not frustrate courts' attempts to protect prisoners from
140 Gray, supra note 31, at 1349 (citing BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES As
AMICUS CURIAE at 16-17, Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (No. 89-
7376)).
141 Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (1991) (White, J., concurring).
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truly inhumane conditions. Hopefully in the future courts will
recognize the importance of maintaining a federal forum for the
redress of genuine prisoner grievances.
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